Coin from the Makedonian city Mendaion

Coin from Cydon

Coin from city state of MA Aron

Coin from the Makedonian city Akandzeion

Coins from the Pelazgian city state of Sekion 350-280 BC, of the Peninsula of Dze

Kyzi - Madzeia coin from the Pelazgian city state near today's Bursa

Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy presented on the stater of Kyzi - coin from the Pelazgian city state near today's Bursa (Turkey). Madzeia, Kyzi, stater of electron (a natural mixture of silver and gold), mid-4th century BC.

Obverse: A large racing horse running to right ridden by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy with beard, causa and Makedonian cap on his head. Imposed with chlamys, down under the horse tuna fish.

Reverse: Weight 16 grams, diameter 19 mm. A sumptuous mint, clear and sharply struck. Extremely rare and so far known from very few specimens.

Coins from Dzetsalia (sity Larisaion)

Coin from city state Avderateion

Coins from city state Qudze or Gorindze (Corinth)

The first Philippic of Demosthenes

In just over a year, from the spring of 352 B.C. by the spring of 351 BC, Makedonia had become the greatest military power in the Aga Sey (Aegean) world. From Dzermopole (Thermopylae) to the Propontion, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy oversees a vast territory, corresponding to a circular arc of over 1000 kilometers. The stakes in the conflict between Adzena and Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy have changed their nature: it is no longer about holding a few places on the Makedonian coast, it is about the security of Adzenika and the security of the Adzaian supply. The continuation of the policy led by Adzena from 357 BC. (a state of principled war, but with very little military action) becomes extremely dangerous. Now it is necessary either to make peace as soon as possible or to start a decisive war. It is precisely this latter attitude that Demosthenes proposes to his fellow citizens in the first Philippic.
Before we consider this speech whose force surprised all ancient and modern interpreters, we should recall the Adzaian opinion in 351 - 53 BC. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is the subject of all conversations, his the smallest actions and movements are appreciated; various voices spread - J, in the sources are called the speeches of Demosthenes against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. Otherwise the adjective "J" means to be against the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy.

The knowledge of the power of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and the danger he posed first caused a patriotic impulse and led to the sending of a unit on a campaign to Dzermopole in 352 BC. A little later, the Asians voted decisively measures to protect Illepont from Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, but these measures are not carried out: the same ones who enthusiastically voted for an expedition often show less zeal to pay the contributions or to go on an expedition. Added to this quite common inconsistency is a tendency to discouragement. Some Asians are gripped by a despondent resignation to fate. Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's achievements give him almost divine power:

''Why then oppose him if he is invincible ?'' 

Many Adzaians who thought the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy insignificant in 353 BC thought him invincible in 351 BC: both opinions have the same factual consequence, inaction. Demosthenes begins his speech by apologizing for speaking first (he is only 33 years old and custom dictates that the elders speak first): this is, he declares, because the usual speakers have said nothing useful in previous debates. The introductory approach to the subject is not modest, but that introduction is deserved because it clearly announces to the listener that he will hear proposals radically different from those he is used to. Demosthenes then gets to the heart of the matter and begins his examination of Adzena's condition with a paradox:

What has hurt you the most in the past is exactly what should reassure you the most in the future. How come? Because the sorry state of your affairs is due to your not having done anything you should have done. And indeed, if you had done all that was necessary and the situation had been as it is now, then there would be no hope that it could be improved..

(R1Ш., I, § 2)
After this, Demosthenes backs up his thesis with historical examples of average conditions corrected thanks to decisive action. The first example is taken from Asian history: it is the victorious war waged by Adzena against Spartan domination in the beginning of the 4th century BC. The second example is precisely Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy himself from the beginning of his reign. If the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy had judged it very difficult to go to war with the Adzaians when they had so many strongholds in his own territory, and he had not a single ally, he would not have done anything of what he accomplished, he would not acquired this great power.

(RШ., I, § 5)
The fact that the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy achieved so much success is not because he has superhuman strength, but because he understood the rules governing international relations. But there was one thing he knew well, Asiatics: 'and that is, that all these places are as much war-stakes available to all without distinction, as by the law of nature, the goods of the absent are to those who are ready to seize them. , the properties of the careless to anyone who is not afraid of trouble and danger. Yes, that was his thought and this is how he subjugated everything, how he holds everything, both what he conquered with weapons and the peoples he made allies and friends of. For it is best to associate, to associate with those who are well prepared, firmly determined to do what is right''.

(RМ., I, § 5-6)
The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is an example, so they can imitate him and oppose him: it is enough for the Adzaians to accept the same rules as him and "with God's help" they will take revenge on "this man". Demosthenes then tries to dispel the objections that his hearers may raise against the effective policy he proposes. He underlines that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is also vulnerable: Do not imagine, indeed, that his present happiness will be as permanent as that of a god. Not even him, Adzaians, hate him, fear him, envy him, even some of those who seem to be the most loyal to him. Only, it is all at rest for the time being, for want of sure help, because of your slowness and your lack of determination.

(RМ., I, § 8)
That there is as yet no rebellion against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, is because the discontented cannot hope for any support; everything would have changed if the azai had intervened decisively. After showing that the advance of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy was not at all inevitable, Demosthenes angrily mentions the ruler's power and intentions: He doesn't even leave you with a choice to act or stay still... He always needs something more; and all around him, he enfolds us in his nets, us who wait instead of act.

(RШ1., I, § 9)
In this exposition, Demosthenes blames, without openly mentioning, the Asians who would try to resign themselves to fate, for the glory of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy knows no bounds. The famous rebuke follows: "When, then, men Adzaians, when will you do the right thing?" The usual answers to this question, which many of Demosthenes' listeners probably muttered, were quite vague: "When there will be something new," "When it will be necessary ". These expressions evoke indignation in Demosthenes:

Eh! what could be more recent than this, a Makedonian attacking the Adzaians and edits things over Adzena?

(RШ., I, § 10)
Continuing his mockery of the speeches given at Adzena, Demosthenes underlines the frivolity of rumors about the health of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy:
"Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy died?" ... No, he is only sick". Dead or sick, what difference do you see in that? Let him disappear; and tomorrow, you yourselves will create another Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, if you treat your interests with the same indifference. For his is not his own strength that made him so powerful, but much more our carelessness.
The paradox presented here is the logical conclusion of the natural law stated above: the goods of the absent belong to those who act (§ 5). If one power stops defending its possessions, its negligence creates a gap that is immediately exploited by another power. The roots of the imbalance are not in the force of the one who spreads his influence, but in the inaction of the one who has given up self-defense.

The Adzaian inaction, Demosthenes continues, would prevent the city from seizing its most favorable opportunities: Even supposing for a moment that misfortune befell him, and that fortune, because she has always done more for us than we have done for ourselves, would do you that favor, do you know what would happen? Present there, helping in the general commotion, you will arrange everything according to your will. But such as you are, the opportunity will give you the sity of Amphipoliton in vain, you will be unable to take it, having neither your strength nor your will ready there.

(RШ.. I, § 12)
The conclusion which clearly follows from the first paragraph of the first Philippic, is that the state depends entirely on the behavior of the Adzaians. The second paragraph is a clear and accurate presentation of an action plan (§ 13-30).

Demosthenes proposes two series of measures: the first require preparations, the second must be carried out immediately. The speaker first lays out a plan of considerable scope: to prevent possible new incursions by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, the Adzaians must arm 50 triremes, be ready to sail themselves, and prepare ships to transport half the cavalry (also designated to sent to the scene of action) (§ 16).

 Either these preparations will frighten Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, or else he will have to face an Adzaian incursion into Makedonia while his forces operate abroad. Demosthenes does not specify when the 50 trieres should be ready: the shortest period, which must have been clear to the Adzians, was probably a few months.
The measures he foresees in the near future are more modest, but he presents them in a very detailed way: 2000 corporals of which 500 citizens, 200 horsemen of which 50 citizens and 10 fast trires should be constantly kept close to the Makedonian coast. This expeditionary force will constantly reside in the northern Aga Sey (Aegean Sea) and will wage war against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy by frequent raids, in his territory. After clarifying that the presence of citizens in this capital is necessary for mercenaries and strategists to be forced to listen to the people, Demosthenes estimates the annual cost of this army at a total of 92 talents, this amount will not be quite sufficient for the support of the armies, but as he says restrainedly, "the war itself will make up for the rest". 

Demosthenes prepared and presented to the people a financial document explaining where to find the 92 necessary talents; unfortunately, this document is not in our manuscripts. After this exposition, Demosthenes encouraged his fellow citizens to accept his plan. He underlines the military advantages of his proposals. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy would no longer be able to use the Adzaians being blocked by the Etesian winds to attack their allies. The siege of the Makedonian coast with an Adzaian fleet will prevent Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy from robbing the islanders and the Makedonian will have to give up piracy and quick ventures against the Peninsula of Adzenika.

After this justification, the rhythm of the first Philippic accelerates. Demosthenes takes turns sharing advice and criticism faster and faster. The composition of the speech resembles that of some dramatic scenes, at the end of which after the longest tirades come stichomity (replies of a single verse). In a tone of bitter satire, Demosthenes underlines the senselessness of Adzaian behavior by showing several scandalous and devastating contrasts between the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and Adzena, of course, but also between the arrangement of the games and the army. Demosthenes summarizes Adzena's behavior through the image of barbarian boxers:
You, fighting with Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, are doing the same thing that barbarians who fight with their fists do. As soon as one of them is struck somewhere, he places his hand there; he is struck elsewhere, his hands go where the blow goes; and to defend himself, to see what is coming, he neither knows nor thinks about it.

(RМ1., I, 40)
The stake of the solution to be adopted is presented in an increasingly clear and increasingly rough way: One should not go after the events, but before them. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy will not stop if his path is not blocked. Since we do not want to fight him there today, we may be forced to do so here. If you are not determined to complete the task, the situation is really bad.

Whether the first Philippic made an impression on Demosthenes' Adzaian listeners in 351 BC cannot be said. But his proposals were not accepted.
If the first Philippic is unanimously recognized as a masterpiece of oratory, some modern historians have criticized the plan of action proposed by Demosthenes. On the one hand, the costs arising from this plan would exceed Adzena's financial capabilities. On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, the proposed measures would be both ineffective and dangerous: the presence of Adzaian units in the north would not bother Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy at all, while the Adzaian army would be greatly endangered. With this view, the Adzaians would indeed be encouraged not to accept Demosthenes' opinion.

The first remark is not decisive at all. Demosthenes clearly states what it will cost to have 10 triremes and 2000 men permanently present near the Makedonian coast: he does not estimate the cost of the possible later dispatch of 50 triremes and many coplitas, but here we are dealing with assumed costs, which would only be incurred if one attack by the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy imposed them. In that case, the collection of an extraordinary tax could provide the necessary funds. 

The second remark is quite free. Sudden attacks by a small army can cause a lot of damage, even to a very strong country: it is enough for this small army to know how to take advantage of surprise. Furthermore, Demosthenes' plan is two-pronged: if frequent attacks by 2,000 soldiers fail to deter Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy from his attacks, a major campaign will be undertaken to force him to give up the seizure. A continued presence in the North would also act to protect and reassure its allies in the area and spark new connections..

The ultimate goal of these military actions is mentioned only once, and Demosthenes envisages two possibilities: the troops would have to endure, it saysј:

 „Until it suits us to negotiate or until we subdue our enemy". 

It is important to note that the first Philippic does not rule out the possibility of a future peace with the Macedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy: this proves that Demosthenes in 351 BC. not a belligerent and irresponsible avenger as some have thought, this especially shows that his follow-up to the proposals of Philocratas in 348-57 BC. it will not be a sudden reversal, but the outcome of a long reflection on the terms of peace. At the time of the first Philippic, however, Demosthenes thinks that peace is acceptable to Adzena only if the balance of power balances again in favor of Azena or, at least, if the territorial relationship stops changing in favor of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. If one wants peace, one should first prepare to wage war with determination.... ''si vis pace para belum'' - If you want peace, prepare for war - and from here we see that it is Roman and prescribed.


The years 351 and 350 BC. are years of rest for Adzians. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy certainly does not rest, but his campaigns take place far from Aga Sey (Aegean Sea), in Illyria and in Molossia. He also devotes a lot of time to the financial and military arrangement of Dzetsalia. While the Makedonian is consolidating his power, the Adzians, who are still at war with him, are enjoying all the advantages of peace. The revenue of the city increases; the port equipment of Piraeas and the monuments of the city have been restored; the rich no longer pay taxes (eisphora) and are again interested in using the mines; the poor enjoy more freebies.

Demosthenes is convinced that in the near future the expansion of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy will again immediately threaten Asiatic interests. Taking advantage of the temporary lull that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy leaves for Adzena, he advises his fellow citizens to completely overhaul their financial and military arrangements.

The speech "On finance" 

Among the numerous statements of Demosthenes on this subject, only the speech On Finances, delivered probably in 350, has been preserved to us. Demosthenes begins by siding neither with the proponents of monetary handouts, who he says only want to please the people, nor with the wealthy opponents of the principle of these handouts, who are indifferent to the fate of poor citizens. His program maintains the principle of "Olindzeionians" (After the Halchideon city Olindzeion, not ''Olynthiacs'').

OLINDZEIONIANS

1. Support of poor citizens by the city, but requires "every reward to be indivisible from some service rendered". 

Every citizen, young or old, will be sure to live decently in time of war and in time of peace, and the new system will have the advantage of securing the city's military power.
As for the revenue of the city, both that which you give yourselves and which are wasted in unnecessary expenses, and that of your allies, I say that they should be distributed so that each of you shall receive an equal share: for the adult citizens to they serve as a salary, for the oldest, or as a per diem for supervision, or for anything else they want. I also require that you serve personally, without ceding that right to anyone; to have an army which shall really be the army of the city, arranged by its means, so that you may at the same time live in peace and do the necessary.

This plan excludes recourse to mercenaries: the citizens themselves will fight and get paid. The plan of the speech bears similarities to the Spartan arrangement of the class of Equals, although Demosthenes is wary of making such a comparison. Demosthenes ends his speech by underlining the purpose of the reforms he proposes and their necessity: that is to enable Adzena to maintain her position in the castles below Dzermopole in the first place:
          It would be a shame, Adzaians and what a shame! to give up the glorious place which your fathers left you. After all, it is not in your power to give up things in the castles under Dzermopole, even if you wanted to. You have always done a lot; you have friends whom it would be dishonest to leave, enemies whom it is impossible to trust and whom you cannot let grow stronger. After all, what is happening now to your politicians, who cannot withdraw from things whenever they want, has happened to you too, because it is you who lead the politics in the castles below Dzermopole.

Demosthenes complains that his earlier proposals had met with little response, and that one minor detail of his "broad plan" held attention, a proposal to create a new daily allowance of two obols for some things. The speech seems to have had no more success either. Refusing any realignment, the Asiatics neglected to prepare for the continuation of the fighting and condemned themselves in advance to unpreparedness.

The first „Olindzeionian"

* Olindzeionians are called the three speeches of Demosthenes in relation to Olindzeion, the largest city on the Halkideon Peninsula Halki (Bracelets) - de (of D on) - on (Halkidiki), which was at the head of the League of Halkideon composed of separatist city-states on the northern Aegean coast.

In the early summer of 349 BC, the Macedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy judged that the time had come to conquer Halchidon. He sent an ultimatum to the inhabitants of Olindzeion, demanding that they hand over to him the two Makedonian refugees, his half-brothers Aridaoy and Menelaoy. The Olindzeionians refusal immediately provokes the Makedonian incursion. It is likely that the demand for surrender is just a pretext, but it cannot be completely ruled out that there were internal disturbances in Makdonia in 351/350 BC. and that the Olindzeionians received the two Argead princes with the intention of supporting their dynastic wishes against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy.

The threatened inhabitants of Olindzeion seek an alliance with Adzena and her military aid. Demosthenes on this occasion utters his First Olindzeionian to strongly support the Olindzeion claim. According to him, the offer of an alliance from the powerful Confederation of Halkideon is an exceptional opportunity.

(2). The Adzaians must "give themselves fully to the war", giving their money generously, fighting in person, allowing no negligence". 

( 6). Demosthenes reminds the Adzaians of their ptethod inaction and their responsibility for the rise to the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy: "It was we, Adzaians, who made Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy stronger day by day, it was we who provided him with power such as he never had not a single ruler of Makedonia". 

(11). The desires of the Makedonian are limitless: if he gets to Olindzeion, "nothing will stop him from going where he wants", and the Adzaians, since they did not stop him "there", will have to fight him "here". The Adzaians should not behave like reckless "people who borrow at high interest": otherwise, they will have to "pay dearly for their carelessness". 

(15). Demosthenes' reasoning is mathematically rigorous. The development of the balance of power in favor of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is explained by the contrast between his action and the sluggishness to the Adzaians. If the opponents maintain the same views, it is certain that the development will continue "to the end". Since it is excluded that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy himself will put an end to his expansion (the desire to conquer is the passion of his life, says Demosthenes), only one change of behavior on the part of Adzaians can turn the course of history: so it is of vital importance that the Adzaians realize the danger and realize.

After this warning, Demosthenes lays out the plan of action. The Adzaians must send to the northern Aga SEy (the Aegean Sea) two units for a campaign, one to Halkideon to defend the threatened cities, the other to Makedonia to ravage the state of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. This double attack which is very similar to the one already proposed in the First Philippic according to Demosthenes is necessary to get Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy to raise the siege (17-18).

To pay the expenses of this double campaign, the Adzaians, Demosthenes declares, have more money at their disposal than all other nations:

„If they want to use this money for war expenses, they need no other means" (§ 19). 

The allusion to the war fund is clear, but Demosthenes is careful to point out that he is not proposing any decree to use this money for military purposes (such a proposal would be illegal). After briefly recalling his plan for tax reform and lamenting that the people did not approve it, Demosthenes contented himself with proposing an extraordinary tax:
My idea is that we should prepare an army, have something to pay it with, and make it so that every one who took money, should do what he must do; you, on the contrary, are of the opinion that it is good to take money during the holidays without doing anything. Therefore, the only solution, in my opinion, is to establish a general tax: mandatory, if the cost should be large; limited, if he is small. Either way, money is needed; without money, nothing that is necessary can be done.

As in the first Philippic, Demosthenes concludes by underscoring the weight of the stake:

„You have the choice today to either attack Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy at his place or be attacked by him at your place".

The second „Olindzeionian"

The Adzaians quickly made the alliance that the people of Olindzeion sought. This alliance should have been respected and help sent. It seems that a certain number of citizens were terrified by the idea of starting an active war again against the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. Therefore Demosthenes arranges the essence of his second Olindzeionian to show that the power of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is fragile.

The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy created his state with perjury and lies: those he deceived would rise against him at the slightest defeat, especially the Zetsalians. The Macedonians themselves are tired of the wars from which they suffer all the hardships and all the deprivations, while all the benefits are for Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. His court has only mediocre flatterers: the Makedonian, like all tyrants, hates virtuous people. His empire and country are "sick" and their weaknesses will only show if the Asians go decisively to war.

They remarked to Demosthenes that he exaggerates the weaknesses of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and especially that he does not know the attachment of the Makedonian soldiers to their ruler. However, it should be noted that the complaints attributed to Demosthenes herald the hostile speeches of the Makedonian soldiers against Vasileos Makedonon Alexandroy.

But they, having no share in that which satisfies his self-love, crushed by these constant marches from country to country, suffer, live miserably, because they are prevented from working or staying at home, without even the opportunity to use it at will what they can earn, because the country's markets are closed because of the war. (It is evident that the Adzaians or Dmosten did not know or ignored that the army of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy was a paid army, that was their job).

We may ask whether Demosthenes has no notices of resentment among the enemy. Moreover, and especially, the comparison of the second Olindzeionian and the numerous speeches in which Demosthenes emphasizes that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is dangerous shows the deep harmony of his thought and his attitude. The Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy will not be stopped unless stopped, but he is neither invulnerable nor immortal and his power can be broken. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy were invincible, his fortune as constant as that of the gods, the fight against him would be hopeless. This is not the case: everything can change, for Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy as well as for Adzena, and this is what gives the clash that has begun all its fullness.

* The speeches of the Makedonian soldiers during the time of Vasileos Makedonon Alexandroy cannot be called hostile, because it is a request for their return home, due to exhaustion on the one hand and dissatisfaction due to the inclusion of Persians in the administration of the state and the army on the other hand. Otherwise, there is no other example in history of mutual trust, love and loyalty of the army towards its leader and such understanding by the army leader.

The third „Olindzeionian"

A little while after, while the Asai have not yet sent any help, Demosthenes pronounces the third Olindzeionian. 

He first seeks to dispel the self-delusions caused by a few braggarts who speak of "punishment to the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy". The immediate task is to "save the allies" and "this is enough for now". 

Moreover, if the Adzaians continue to avoid the necessary effort, it will not be Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy who will be threatened, but Adzenika. The diplomatic situation makes the threat very serious: if Olindzeion falls, neither the very weak Phocians nor the Dzevans, enemies of Adzena, will prevent Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy "from there showing them the weight of his weapons".

After this appeal to reality, Demosthenes immediately attacks the main legal obstacle to a decisive policy which is imposed by the "law of Eubulos for the theoricon". He calls for the introduction of a "nomoteti service" to repeal this harmful law, suggesting, no doubt mockingly, that the law's creators themselves provide the impetus for its repeal. A scathing criticism of Adzaians political habits follows, which is especially directed at Eubulos and his friends, but without naming them. Responsible for Adzena's inaction are the flatterers who appropriated the people's power and who turned the citizens into beneficiaries of social assistance:

'' Now, on the contrary, politicians are the ones who dispose of everything, everything is done through them; and you the people, enraged, deprived of your money and your allies, reduced to the condition of servants, being citizens after all, you are happy if they give you some of the show money, if they prepare a procession in the month of Boedromion; in the end, a trait of courage that surpasses all, you are grateful to them for giving you what is yours. As for them, having imprisoned you in this city, they engage you in quarrels and tame you to tame you ''.


** Boedromion is month in the Adzaian calendar = September.
*** In the original it says: These, after imprisoning you in this city, lead you to domesticate you by making you subject to them.

 Despite the third Olindzeionian, the people do not start a procedure to abolish the "law on theoricon". At the end of the summer the Adzaians send to Halkideon 38 trires and 2000 peltasts under the leadership of Hares. A little later, they order Charidemus who was then on the Ilepont (not ''hellespont'') to join Hares with his 18 trires, 4000 peltasts and 150 cavalry. The effort made by Adzena is not great, but these expeditionary companies are not an insignificant help to the inhabitants of Olindzeion: at the beginning of the spring of 348 BC, Charidemus took from the Makedonians the territories that they had conquered. Moreover, the inhabitants of Olindzeion can hope that this first support will be followed by more assistance. It is probable that in the spring of 348 BC the Adzaians would have heeded Demosthenes' advice at least in part and would have made a desperate effort to save Olindzeion if the disturbances on the island of Eyvoya had not drawn their attention.

Rebellion on Еyvoya

The cities of the island of Eyvoya entered the Adzaian confederation in 357 BC. after the failure of the Dzevan attempted surveillance over the large island (near both Adzenika and Voioa). The apparent peace of Eyvoya of 357 BC. was uncertain because of hostilities between Eyvoyans cities (especially between Halkis and Eretria) and because of the fighting of groups inside the cities. To maintain their influence, the Adzaians relied, according to the occasion, on the various currents and sometimes supported tyrants who were rumored to be pro-Adzaians like Plutarch of Eretria. Personal connections between the Adzaians speakers and Eyvoyans leaders also play an important role: Plutarch of Eretria is a friend of Media, an influential member of Eubulus' circle.
During the winter of 349/348 BC, a revolt breaks out in Eretria and the tyrant Plutarch is driven out. At the instigation of Medea and Eubulos, a small company of Asiatic coplites under Phocion is sent to Eyvoya to restore Plutarch to power. Despite his victory at Tamynae, Phocion soon finds himself in a difficult position as he has to face a general rebellion on Eyvoya. The march to the Adzaian army had the effect of uniting most of the Eyvoyans against Adzena. The uprising was led by a determined leader, Kallia of Kalkis, whose program consisted of three points:

- Eyvoy to the Eyvoyians,

- leadership of Kalkis, and

- power for Kalkis.

Plutarch himself, who had called the Adzaians to their aid, associates himself with their opponents.


No source says that Eyvoya's revolt was caused by the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, but this uprising is so convenient for him that the assumption could not be rejected. As early as 351 BC, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy tries to raise some Eyvoyans against Adzena; Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy (§ 37), Demosthenes inserts a letter from Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy to the Eyvoyans, especially "insolent" in relation to the Adzaians. Kalkis in any case seeks an alliance with the ruler of Macedonia; the latter agrees, promises him his own financial support and perhaps sends several companies.
The Adzaians, embroiled in two clashes on two different battlefields, must make a difficult strategic choice: should the Olinzeians be helped first, or should Eyvoya's rebellion be quelled? Demosthenes is a supporter of the first solution and one can easily form a picture of his thinking. Further delays in sending the Adzaian aid to Olindzeion risk the irretrievable loss of an important ally; when Olindzeion is saved, there will still be time to restore the Adzaian order to Eyvoya. True to his strictly defensive strategy, Eubulus has the opposite opinion: Olindzeion is far from Adzena, while Eyvoya is quite close and of primary interest to the security of the city. Eubul's opinion wins: the people vote to round up coplites and horsemen en masse and send them to Eyvoya.

The decree of Apollodoros

Fighting two wars at the same time is causing Aadzena great financial difficulties. Apollodoros.

The interference to the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy on the Peninsula of Dze.

The second ''Philippic''

In 346 the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy could not make a military campaign that would have imposed him as an arbiter in the political affairs of the Dze Peninsula, but the state of the Dze Peninsula gave him numerous opportunities to expand his influence in the area. Most of the city-states waged very fierce social and political struggles: in many cases, one of the groups (usually the oligarchic) sent a call to dominate its opponents. The oligarchs of Megara and Elis seem to have received funds and mercenaries from Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy in 345 BC..

The threat that Sparta burdens its neighbors Metsenanon, Megapoliton and Argos represents a second chance for the ruler of Makedonia. Unable to count on Adzena, an ally of Sparta, nor on the weakened Dzeva, the cities that fear the restoration of Spartan power seek protection from the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. 

An inscription mentioned by Didymus reveals to us that at the end of 345 BC. the inhabitants of Metsenanon and Megapoliton asked to be admitted to the Amfiktoiada: they met with refusal, (such a development would have diminished their importance), but it is possible that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy was inclined to such a transformation as would enable him to exercise supremacy over the entire Peninsula of Dze, starting with Delphi.

As the Spartans renewed their attacks against their neighbors in the spring of 344 BC, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy sent mercenaries to the aid of Metsenanon, and spread word that he himself was preparing to come to undertake a campaign against Sparta. 

(Phil., 2,  15). Demosthenes succeeds in being sent by the people as an envoy to the Peninsula of Dze and warns the inhabitants of Argos and Metsenanon against the Makedonian alliance; because of their trust in Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, the inhabitants of Olindzeion saw their city destroyed and the Dzetsalians lost their freedom.

 (Phil., 2,  20-23):

 „The only protection of democracies against tyrants is mistrust" (24).

Demosthenes fails to separate the inhabitants of Metsenanon, Argos and Megapoliton from the Makedonian alliance, but his action provokes a written objection from Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy who is surprised by the hostile behavior of his Adzaian "allies". While the Adzaians agree on the answer to be given to this letter by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, Demosthenes speaks his second Philippic. 

The second Philippic

Contrary to the first Philippic and to the Olindzeionians, this speech does not propose any immediate measure. Demosthenes probably knows that the Adzaeans will send a polite and conciliatory answer to the ruler of Macedonia, and in fact he does not see any harm in Adzena showing the same hypocrisy as Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. The second Philippic wants to influence the Adzaian opinion, it is an exposure of the short-term and long-term plans of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, and a declaration in favor of a policy of resistance based on distrust.

Demosthenes notes that, since the conclusion of the peace, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy has consistently supported the Dzevans and their allies from the Dze Peninsula to the detriment of the Adzaians' interests; the voices of misunderstanding between Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and Dzeva are completely unfounded for now. This bias of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is quite natural:

He knows that the Dzevans fought on the side of the barbarians /in 480 BC/ and that the people of Argos did nothing to stop them. That is why he is sure that both, concerned about their own interests, will not be concerned at all about the common interests of the Dze Peninsula. He tells himself that if he wants our friendship, he will have it only on the condition that he adheres to justice, while by associating with them, he will make them the helpers of his glory.

(Phil., 2 11-12)
The Asiatics are the only ones aware of and only concerned about common interests: these very harsh statements about others probably express Demosthenes' irritation after the failure of his diplomatic campaign on the Dze Peninsula. At the beginning of 344 BC, Adzena is as lonely as in the fall of 346 BC. The situation calls for caution. Demosthenes is wary of proposing military action against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, but also asks the Adzaians to be aware of the gravity of the danger. In his afterword, he calls upon them to deal severely with the one responsible for the present state of things who had given Dzermople (Thermopylae) to Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy: it is clear that he is preparing to renew his process against Aeschines.

Persian Legation and Python's Task

Before launching a great campaign to end the secession of Egypt, the Great Ruler Artaxerxes Ochus sends a series of embassies to the cities. In Dzeva and Argos, the task of the Persian envoys is clear: they must obtain permission to collect mercenaries. The purpose of the Persian envoys in Adzena is different: forced to depopulate Adzenica somewhat due to his Egyptian campaign, the Achaemenid (Achaemenid is the name of the Persian ruling dynasty) ruler is afraid that the Makedonian ruler the Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy - Philip of Makedonia will use the gap thus created to launch a campaign against him in Adzenica. On such a supposition, he would wish the Adzaeans to renew hostilities in the Peninsula of Dze against the Makedonian: he promises them considerable sums to finance that war.

Fearing an agreement between the Great Ruler and the Azaeans against him, Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon sends one of his companions, Python of Py, to Adzena, charging him to make all the necessary promises to the Adzaeans to dissuade them from the Persian alliance. Python promises a review of the treaty of 346 BC. in accordance with the Adzaian wishes and is careful not to object to the demands expressed by the Adzaians. The assembly is seduced by his attractive propositions, and rejects the Persian offers with haughty words, evidently incited by the Philippians: the people pass a decree declaring that:

„The friendship of the Adzaians towards the Great Ruler continues, only if the Great Ruler does nothing against the Dze Peninsula" adding that "if the Great Ruler causes any disorder, the Adzaians will summon Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon and all of the Dze Peninsula against him".

Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon he achieved what he wanted.

Artaxerxes, rebuffed by the Adzaeans, liaises with the Makedonian court and perhaps makes a secret non-aggression pact.

Realizing that the Adzaians were increasingly misled by Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon, Demosthenes and Hegesippus avoided outright rejection of his offers of reconsideration, but instead urged the people to demand such significant changes that Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon would be forced to reject them. Prompted by Hegesippus, the Adzaians propose that the article referring to the ``status quo'' ("each shall preserve what he holds") be replaced by an article recognizing the legal rights of both parties ("each shall obtain that which belongs to him"). Such a text would allow the Adzaians to demand the return of Amphipoton and all the places that Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon had seized since his enthronement. This new wording is clearly unacceptable to the Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon:

''The ruler does not hide his bad mood and behaves very coldly towards the Adzaian negotiator Hegesippus''.

Opponents of Makedonia use the change in the attitude of the ruler and declare him a fraud, who promises a lot but who does not keep his word. The Vasileos Philippoy Makedonon again becomes unpopular in Adzena, but this turn of events occurs after the rejection of Persian proposals by the Adzaians. Basically, Python's task accomplished what it wanted.

The Trial of Philocratas and the Deputation Process

The hour seems to have come for Demosthenes and his friends to bring the most famous Philippians (supporters of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, they were precisely corrupt) to trial. Hyperidos undertakes an "eisangolia" against Philocratas expressed thus: 

„As a speaker, he supports proposals contrary to the interests of the Adzian people, because he receives money and gifts from the enemies of the people."

The assembly votes in principle against Philocrates and Hyperides takes the case to court. Without waiting for the day of judgment, Philocrates prefers to leave Adzena. He is sentenced to death in absentia. 

In his speech against Ayshinas, Demosthenes presents the venality of Philocratas as a matter of common knowledge:

Not only did Philocratas often confess before you in the Assembly that he had taken bribes, but he also showed it to you by his actions, buying grain, building, even saying that he would have gone to Makedonia even if he had been elected by you, importing wood, exchanging gold in front of everyone.

(De falsa legatione,  14)
For his part, Aeschinas, far from defending Philocrates, tries to deny any connection with him. It is possible that Philocratas was at once corrupt, shameless and imprudent, but it cannot be excluded that in his absence he was much slandered: Demosthenes to try to damn Ayshinas with him, and Ayshinas to pass all the sins on him himself to unload from them.

The condemnation of Philocratas is a success for the opponents of Makedonia. Demosthenes continues the attack, ending the accusation of treason that he had begun against Ayshinas as early as 346 BC. The trial lasts a whole day. The prosecutor and the defense have 11 clepsydras each. Demosthenes' speech On the unfaithful deputation as we read it is extremely long, much longer than Ayshinas defense, so many interpreters assume that after the trial Demosthenes inserted a number of new statements into his text, with a view to its publication. The main points of the reasoning, however, were probably not changed.

Demosthenes marks his crowning points of the accusation as soon as he gets into the content:

Ayshin did not follow the instructions given to the deputies, he deceived the people with false reports, he contributed to the Asians missing opportunities and he did all these things because he was sold to the Makedonian the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy (§ 4-9). Demosthenes then recalls the hostility that Ayshinas first displayed towards Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy during the negotiations in 348-346 BC. The meaning of this initial recall is clear:

Demosthenes wants to imply that Ayshinas changed his policy so quickly and so completely only because he was bought by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy during his first stay at Bellas.

Without paying attention to the order of events, Demosthenes sets forth at length the appeasing and lying speeches that Ayshinas made after his return from the second legation, public speeches which later events apparently belied.

In an unconvincing manner, he claims that the decrees then passed by the Adzaians at the instigation of Ayshinas and Philocratas were the reason why the Phocians surrendered.

''If Ayshinas betrayed the interests of Adzana through stupidity and misunderstanding, Demosthenes declares, it would be just that he should be punished, for no fool is compelled to engage in politics. However, if Ayshinas had only acted out of stupidity and ignorance, he would have generously advised the people to set him free (§ 101). Ayshinas should be severely punished, because he sold himself to Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy to play the Adzaians. ''

For this key accusation, Demosthenes has no proof and relies on indicators.

Ayshinas sudden turn is clearly suspicious.

Ayshinas should have felt rage against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy if the ruler had lied to him:

that is not the case (§ 103-110).

Demosthenes does not hesitate to mix things up: Aeschinas is Philocratas' accomplice; and Philocratas confessed that he had taken money; so also Ayshinas, zel. Demosthenes underlines the importance of the stake.

It is quite possible that these people claim that you will incur the hatred of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy a if you punish those whose embassies led to peace. I, on the other hand, if that is true, I don't see what else I could find, even with a lot of searching, that would accuse Ayshinas harder.

Indeed, if the man who spent money to bring about peace, if that man is now so dangerous and so powerful that henceforth you will have to forget oaths and justice to examine what pleasure you could give Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, what punishment those responsible for this should be brought forward to be punished as they deserve?

However, I believe I can even show that it is more likely to be the beginning of a beneficial friendship for you. Indeed it should be well known, Asiatics, that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy did not despise your country, that it was not because he judged you less useful than the Dzevans that he preferred them; but because he was informed by these people here and told them what I had already said in front of you in the Parliament without any of them denying me: 

„The people are the most indeterminate and inconsistent thing in the world, like the restless waves of the sea moving without order; one comes, the other goes; no one cares or thinks about the common interest.

Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy should have friends who, at every opportunity, will act in your favor and accomplish what he himself would do and he will easily get everything he wants from you".

If Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, I suppose, understood that those who told him this were executed immediately after their return here, he would have acted as the (Persian) Great Ruler / after condemning to death the deputies whom he had bribed/.

(De falsa legatione,  134-137)
In other words, if the court punishes Aishin, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy will honestly ask for the friendship of the Adzian people instead of buying speakers to lie to them. Only then does Demosthenes approach the main point of his accusation, the course of the second legation. The procedure is skillful. When Demosthenes describes the game of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and the peculiar posture of the Adzaian envoys, he has already provided the judges with a key to interpreting Ayshinas' behavior: his venality.

In the second part of his speech, Demosthenes, through small strokes, directs a wide variety of attacks against his opponent's family, against his private life, and against his political behavior (179-314). He mocks especially the new conceit shown by Ayshinas and slyly hints that he has become an oligarch.:

He is now a landowner and a great person. Here is the reality. Before he caused our country all possible evils, he admitted that he was a scribe and thanked you for his election, he had an exemplary posture. After causing 1000 evils, he prostrates himself; say to him: "Ayshinas the former scribe," he is at once your enemy, and holds himself offended; he walks about the Agora, with a cloak drawn to his heels, with swollen cheeks, for henceforth he is your guest and friend of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, one of those people who want to get rid of democracy, who see only disorder and madness in the present state, he who used to fall on his face before the building of the prytans. (In the original it says "tholos". It is a building with a circular form in which the pritans sat.)

(De falsa legatione, 314)
Demosthenes then returns with vehemence to the strongest point of his proof, the exposure of Aeschinas' attitude during the second legation and after his return: thanks to Ayshinas and his accomplices, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy achieved his goals, without immediately spoiling himself reputation (§ 315-331). By condemning Ayshinas, the speaker concludes, the Adzaians will force Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the people, or at least prevent him from finding other traitors to recruit. (§ 341-345).

Aeschinas's defense is very skillful.

He gives a very clear account of all the negotiations with Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy as they took place, which enables him to emphasize the cooperation of Demosthenes and Philocrates. He very quickly goes through the main remarks that Demosthenes makes to him: he is content to note that the main reason for the destruction of Phocis, is Fortuna (Fortuna the goddess of luck among the Romans, and among the Adzaians is ''Tykhe'', so this is a Roman transcript.) (131) and that the people shared his "feelings" (Ayshinas avoids saying his "delusions") about the intentions of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. Uncertain about the essentials, Ayshinas refutes Demosthenes' inaccuracies in detail:

''It is incorrect that Ayshinas made a speech unworthy of Adzena before the deputies of the 19th "1aphebolion", because they did not come ( 57-62);

It is not true that the procrastination of the second parliament was to blame for the defeat of Kersoblept, which occurred before ( 89-93).''

Unable to dismiss Demosthenes' strategic and political reasoning, Ayshinas is very adept at pointing out his exaggerations, his lies, and his subterfuges.

The incident with the Olindzeionian diaper gives him the opportunity for a victorious rebuttal. Demosthenes claims that during the second legation at Bellas, Ayshinas, at the end of a feast, ordered an Olynzean captive to be stripped and flogged. (Demosth., De falsa legatione, 196-200).

Demosthenes tries to obtain testimony from an inhabitant of Olindzeion named Aristophanes; the latter refuses, ... and testifies in favor of Aeschines that Demosthenes tried to extort false testimony from him. Ayshinas friends probably spread the word among the judges just before the trial, for Demosthenes was booed when he mentions the incident (Ayshinas., De legatione, §4). Ayshinas responds in an insulted tone to the personal attacks from Demosthenes: what a shame to attack his father, who contributed to the overthrow of the Thirty (Oligarchic government in Adzena established after its defeat by Sparta in 404.) (§ 147-148)!

''What a shame that a deserter like Demosthenes tries to condemn a brave fighter like him'' (Aeschinas uses the occasion to enumerate his campaigns) ( 167-170).

These angry objections do not prevent Ayshinas from interspersing his speech with malicious stories about his opponent's private life. He especially repeats the shameful, oft-repeated, gossip about the married life of the great orator: 

Demosthenes moved his lover Knossion under his roof, and his wife, indignant, took her revenge by becoming Knossion's mistress; the marriage of Demosthenes was a marriage between three.

Ayshinas is acquitted, but narrowly, with only a 30-vote majority.

The sloppiness and dishonesty of Demosthenes' accusation probably irritated several judges; the absence of obvious evidence of Ayshinas's venality probably induced several others to leniency; the testimonies of Eubulos and Phocion undoubtedly went in his favor. However, the acquittal of Ayshinas, after the condemnation of Philocrates, reflects the division of Adzaian opinion and its wavering. Many Adzaians, however disappointed and irritated by the failure of the review of the terms of the peace, are still hesitant to completely condemn the conciliatory policy towards Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy whose chief spokesman is Ayshinas.

New proposals of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy; The speech about Halones

The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy still continues his interference in the Dze Peninsula. In 343 BC, he militarily supported his followers in Oreos and Eretria on Eyvoya. In the autumn of the same year, he replaces the ruler of Moloosia Aribai with the young brother of Olympia, Alexander of Moloosia, whom he raised at the court in Makedonia and to whom he is very close (evil tongues portray him as the boy's heresy). At the beginning of spring he undertakes, in principle at Alexander's expense, the conquest of the cities of Cassopia (to the northwest of the Ambracian Gulf). His intention is probably to go to the Gulf of Qudze; then he could transfer armies to the Dze Peninsula without worrying about the Dzevans and Adzaians, whose possible resistance would be bypassed from the west. Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's plans are foreseen in time: Ambracia, the Acarnanians and the Phocians seek an alliance with Adzena, who immediately agrees and sends troops to Acarnania. In the face of this determined resistance, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy did not make an effort and returned to Makedonia.

Taught by this Adzaian meddling, the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy fears that Adzena will succeed in rallying against him the city-states and peoples threatened by his avarice. On the contrary, he sees in the release of Ayshinas an encouraging sign: perhaps not all hope is lost for the restoration of trust in relations with the Adzaians. The capture of the island of Halones by the Makedonian fleet gives the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy an opportunity for generous behavior: since this small island belonged to the Adzaians before the pirates appropriated it, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy proposes to give it to the Asians. In the same letter, he proposes to resolve all minor conflicts between Adzena and Makedonia:

'' He proposes to arbitrate the question of the Thracian places he has seized, as well as the border dispute between the inhabitants of Cardia and the clergy of Ilepont. He proposes the conclusion of a trade agreement and joint action against piracy in Aga Sey (Aegean Sea).

Finally, he proposes that all of the Se Peninsula have the opportunity to join the peace of Philocrates: having retreated south of Dzermopole, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is quite disposed to a common peace that would confirm his leading position.''

A discussion begins in the Parliament. Some speakers declare that this letter is a "good text," but Demosthenes and Hegesippus persuade the people to oppose it by clearly rejecting all of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's proposals. Regarding Halones, both emphasize that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy should give them return the island to the Adzaians (apodounai), not give it to them (dounai).

Ayshinas, in notes to Demosthenes that Adzena quarreled with Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy "quarrelling over syllables".

The rejection of all proposals of the ruler by the Adzian Assembly testifies to the growing rise of anti-Makedonian speakers; the politics of resistance wins over the conciliatory politics preached by the ''Philippists''. Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy realizes that the development of the Adzaian opinion is not in his favor and gives up his attempts to win it over..

The letters he continues to send to the Adzaians are no longer declarations of friendship or offers of concessions, but objections and threats.

The Adzaian seizure

At the end of 342 BC. an immediate clash between Adzena and the Macedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is not yet in sight. However, the Adzaian intervention in Acarnania earlier in the year cemented Adzena's reputation; In many city-states, Makedonia's opponents, and especially the Democrats, are increasing their influence thanks to the hope in the Adzaian support. Adzena emerges from its diplomatic isolation, and Demosthenes develops numerous connections with the intention of expanding the city's network of alliances. The Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, however, threw himself into conquering all of eastern Thrace as far as the Pyanon Sea (Black Sea). This campaign, which threatens the sea straits from Ilepont to Pyon, worries both the Asians and the cities in the area..

To strengthen their position on the Ilepont, the Adzaians as early as 343 BC. they sent new clergy to the peninsula; a squad of mercenaries placed under the command of the strategist Diopite is tasked with protecting their settlement. Most of the cities of Ilepont gladly accept the reinforcement of clerics. But Cardias, an ally of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy since at least 346 BC, summons the ruler of Makedonia who, having proposed a procedure of arbitration, which the Asians refused, sends several detachments to support her. In revenge, and also because he needed to pay his army, Diopaitus plundered more Thracian places from Vasileondon of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. Making his case more difficult, he tortures and blackmails the Makedonian deputy who came to ask him to release the captives. In the spring of 341, Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy addressed a letter of protest to the Adzaians, in which he specifically demanded the impeachment of Diopaitus.

Some Adzaian speakers appreciate that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's transfers are justified, that his claim is justified, and that refusing to heed it will lead to war.

Demosthenes in his speech On the Illepont, delivered on this occasion, vehemently opposes such an assessment:

Very often, Adzaians, I wonder what is usually said here; yet I was never (surprised) more than yesterday, when I heard, in the Council of 500, someone declare that you should be clearly given a choice between two possibilities: either war or peace..., no doubt, the choice is possible if the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, for his part, wants to be peaceful, if he does not retain, despite the agreement, anything that is ours, if he does not incite everyone against you; in that case, yes, let's say nothing, let's live in peace; and I see well that, for your part, you are also prepared for it.

But if our mutual oaths; if the terms of the peace which we have accepted are before our eyes, if their text remains written, and if, in spite of this, it is evident that from the first day, before the departure of Diopait, before the sending of the clergy who are today alleged to be the causes of the war , the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, against all right, seized many of our dominions, and your accusatory decrees are here, still valid, to confirm it, if indeed, since then, he has not ceased to appropriate to himself what they belongs to other countrymen and barbarians to use against us, what is the meaning of this declaration, that we should make war or peace?
Hey, no, we don't have to make this choice; one other option remains for us, an option which justice and necessity dictate, and that is to defend ourselves against the advancing bully.

(De Chersoneso, 4 - 7)
From a legal point of view, Demosthenes' accusation is incorrect: the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy had until then carefully guarded against violating any of the provisions of Philocrates' peace (at least not the one he swore to three months after the Adzaians), while Diopaitus is perpetrator of several major offenses.

His assessment of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's overall strategy, on the contrary, underscores the obvious: Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's expansion in all directions threatens Adzena. Demosthenes does not deny that Diopaitus might have made a few outbursts (mitigation is obligatory), there will always be time to punish him, if need be, in the hour of rendering accounts. But it would still be disastrous to recall the detachments sent by Diopaitus, as some suggest: it would mean giving up the Illepont and the whole region of the straits to Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy.

Demosthenes predicts that the inhabitants of Py (not Byzantion), for the time being deaf to the offer of alliance from the Asiatics, will themselves immediately call upon them when Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy besieges them. It is futile to send detachments when Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy has already attacked, his attacks should be prevented by a military presence on the spot.

The opinion of Demosthenes is approved by the Council and the Assembly: Diopaitus and his mercenaries are detained on the Illepont.

The third Philippic

In the speech On Illepont, Demosthenes justifies his support of Diopatheus by the necessity of obstructing the will to power to the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. 

The third Philippic, delivered a few weeks later, takes up and expands on the exposure of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy's deeds and gloating, and proposes a set of military and diplomatic measures to preserve Adzena's freedom. Every session of the Assembly, or almost every session, gives rise to debates about Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. It seems that no one dares anymore to support that Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy is right, but many speakers are warning the people about the dangers of a policy that leads to war.

To praise the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy has become inappropriate, to celebrate peace is very desirable. Demosthenes accepts that peace is preferable to war, but the Adzaians should not be deceived by the words used by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. They can, if they like, imitate his hypocrisy, but it is important that they are discerning:

''f our adversary, who has arms in hand and surrounds himself with considerable forces, covers himself with the word peace, while at the same time giving himself up to war, what remains for us to do but defend ourselves?

If you still like to say, like him, that you will remain silent in spite of this, I will not be the one to oppose it. Only, to understand as a state of peace the condition which will enable Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, after he has taken possession of all that remains, to come and attack us at home, that is first pure madness; and it is only to call that what is undoubtedly peace for him if it depends on us, but it is by no means for us if it depends on him''.

(Phil., Ill,  8-9)
The interventions or intentions of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy in Megara, in Eyvoya, in Thrace, in the Peninsula of Dze are "warlike acts" against Adzena (18). 

Demosthenes then expands his analysis and suggests that the people "debate the interests of all the countrymen, for they are in great danger." If one compares the rule of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy with the rulers of the past, what is surprising is the inaction of the countrymen against the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy: they did not accept the injustices of the Adzaians and Lacedaemonians in the past, but they concede to Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy "the right to act arbitrarily, to damage and destroy at will, all the countrymen, one after another, to attack cities and enslave them" ( 22).

Demosthenes, in relation to the city-states, takes up an argument he had already developed in the First Philippic regarding Adzena, which he blames for the successes of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy:

''The will to power is natural, not resisting the wars of others is a disease with fatal consequences''.

He attributes the responsibility for the evil to politicians bribed by Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. The explanation may seem insufficient. In fact, refusing to see that the negligence of the city-states could have arisen from a decadence of their character or from a lesser attachment to liberty, he also casts doubt on all the citizens of the various citye states.

''Corruption would be less developed if the people continued to punish corrupt individuals with the same severity.''

The influence of bribed orators would be less, if the people would not listen to their flattery and their harmful counsels: the more agreeable it is to believe that a state of peace continues, and that all exertion is unnecessary... (§ 64).

City states must urgently change their habits. It is in the nature of the Adzaians to fight back and encourage other cities states to fight back. They must establish the widest possible network of alliances. Demosthenes even proposes to send envoys to the ruler of Persia, "for he also has an interest, not to allow Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy to put everything under his authority" (§ 71).

They must at the same time prepare triremes, money, troops: this military effort is necessary if they want their diplomatic moves to be taken seriously.   

The work of Demosthenes and other sources on the orator 295 of the orator, but, if Didymus is to be believed, an imitation by the historian Anaximenes of Lampsacus, included in the 8th book of his Philippics.

The fourth Philippic

Finally, The fourth Philippic is sometimes regarded as a later imitation, since it literally takes some developments from other speeches of Demosthenes. The reasoning is not convincing: any speaker engaged in a difficult political struggle must repeat himself if he is to convince.

Delivered and preserved speeches

Today, the speeches of our politicians are recorded and usually published in the Official Gazette or in the press. In the 5th century in Adzena there is nothing similar. Demosthenes did not even have, like Cicero, a slave stenographer to record his speeches as he delivered them. In Adzena, an unprepared speech, whatever its immediate political effect, is irretrievably lost to the future.

It is known that Demosthenes did not like to speak unprepared. He carefully prepared most of his speeches in Parliament and in court, but this does not mean that he completely wrote all his speeches. The collection of 49 Prologues preserved in several manuscripts allows us to enter a little into the "workshop of the orator". Knowing that the approach to the subject matter is most important, he prepared in advance a whole series of introductions to answer the most common cases (some of these introductions do not fit of the preserved speeches).

Other 4th-century Philippics are also lost, namely that of Anaximenes of Lampsacus (c. 380-320), who was particularly concerned with the events at Adzena and who introduced into his history an imitation of Demosthenes, successful enough to be included in the collection of Demosthenes. The general history of Ephorus 46 (405-330 BC), which begins with the return of the Araclides (in 1104 BC, according to him), continues to the siege of Berintion (not Perinh ) by the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy in 340 BC. The last books of this very famous work in Antiquity were attributed to Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy and Demosthenes, but we have no surviving part.

Some local histories of Adzenica (not Attica) finally give prominence to the struggle of Demosthenes against Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy. This is especially the case with the Adzaian History (Atidata - Atthis) by Philochorus (ca. 340-261 BC). This author, the last great Adzenika historian, is also a patriotic democrat who played an important role during the revolt against Makedonia in 268-261 BC. (The Chremonides War). The precious data afforded us by the rare extant portions of the 6th book of the Atidata (Attis) 48 make us regret the loss of the rest of the work.

Among the later historians whose work has survived to us, Diodorus of Sicily (c. 90-20 BC) covers the period from 360 to 336 BC.. in his 16 book, but he devotes as much space to the events in the East and Sicily as to those in the Peninsula of Dze and Makedonia. His account, which describes events year by year, provides a valuable timeline, but contains curious gaps: Diodorus, for example, recounts the capture of Elatea, but says nothing about the case of Amphisa or the fourth holy war that led to the involvement of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy in Akarania.

As for the Philippics of Trogus Pompeii (1st century BC), their title may be deceiving, for it is a General History known to us only through the excessive abridgment of Justin (probably from the 3rd c. AD). Books 7 to 9, which depict the reign of Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy, detail the ruler's abuses, fines and debauchery, which is certainly not without interest, but they convey in a confused way the political and military advances of the Makedonian ruler.

The rarity and mediocrity of surviving histories of the reign of the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy contrasts with the number and abundance of sources devoted to Demosthenes himself.

We actually have numerous biographical notes on Demosthenes. The two most detailed "Biographies" are that of Plutarch (c. 50-125 AD), which compares Demosthenes and Cicero, and the one found in the "Biographies of the Ten Orators." In addition, many young people who studied the work of Demosthenes in seminary schools needed introductions, notes, interpretations, and dictionaries. Among the large number of interpretations devoted to Demosthenes by speakers from the 4th century to the Pomeian (not "byzantine") period, we will mention only a few particularly interesting works.
The precious historical interpretation of the Alexandrian history interpreter Didymus (ca. 80-10 BC) is known to us through large portions found on papyrus.
Dionysus of Halicarnassus (a contemporary of Augustus)'s On the Style of Demosthenes enthusiastically explains the reasons why Demosthenes is the greatest Adzaian prose writer. 

The first 1. 302 The Work of Demosthenes and Other Sources on the Orator letter to Ammaeus, in which Dionysus tries to establish the date of Demosthenes's major speeches, is even more important for the historian. Dionysus contrasts Demosthenes' texts with the historical accounts at his disposal, especially the Attis of Philochorus. The procedure is excellent in its principle, but Dionysus gives us only the result of his searches, never the reasoning that led him to it. Some of his conclusions indicate that he always did not fully understand the political and strategic significance of Demosthenes' text. One can be a great literary critic without fully understanding the problems of foreign policy.
In the 4th century, the great orator Libanius composed an introductory note for each speech, which briefly indicated the circumstances and the commitment. These highly regarded notes are taken up in many manuscripts of Demosthenes.
After a hiatus, interpretations of Demosthenes began again during the Pomeranian Renaissance, represented especially by Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople from 858 to 886 and a great lover of classical Asian literature: Photius dedicated an excellent note to Demosthenes in his Library (490-495).

The Adzeian (AIΣXINHE - AISHINAS) Demosthenes

If you Demosthenes had as much power as your mind, they would never have ruled the Adzeians (Danai's), the warlike Makedonians - from the Adzeian (After 80 BC - ATHENA - Athens) monument to Demosthenes 

 

 

" The Adzeians (Danai's it was still there then Danai's - After 80 BC - ATHENA - Athens) and their allies ... at every opportunity cursed Philip (the Makedonian ruler Vasileos Makedonon Philippoy), his family and his kingdom, his forces on land and at sea, as well as the entire race and name of the Makedonians . " - Titus Livius - the historian Tito Livius - lived from 59 BC. to 17 AD , means that when "reforms" have already been made by Octavian, it means that he has already named after the "new" reforms.